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Executive Summary 
The persistence of socioeconomic outcomes across generations acts as a barrier to a society’s 
ability to exploit its resources efficiently. In order to derive policy measures which aim at 
accelerating intergenerational mobility, we review the existent body of research on the causes, 
effects and the measurement of intergenerational mobility. We also present recent empirical 
works which study intergenerational mobility in Europe, around the Globe, and its relevance for 
economic growth. We recommend four policy measures to reduce the negative impacts of 
intergenerational persistence in economic outcomes: universal and high-quality child care and 
pre-school programs; later school tracking and increased access to vocational training to reduce 
skill mismatch and facilitate technological development; integration programs for migrants; and 
simultaneous investment in schooling and later social security programs.  
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1. Introduction 
 Children inherit some of their characteristics from their parents; this is true of 
social and economic characteristics as well as their genetic traits. At least in part 
because of the social, economic, and cultural capital transmitted across generations, 
children of more highly educated or higher earning parents are more likely to attain 
higher levels of education and earn more themselves compared to descendants of 
other parents. In this report, we discuss the current thinking on why this is the case and 
present empirical findings from the literature on the degree of intergenerational 
persistence for different groups of people across Europe. The main objective of this 
report is to suggest public policy to guide the degree of intergenerational persistence 
towards a level that sustains and stimulates welfare, wealth, and work in Europe, and 
which will foster an environment conducive to steady economic growth. It is useful to 
start with a general discussion about what exactly intergenerational persistence is, why 
it exists, and how we can measure it before proceeding to a discussion of the existing 
state of knowledge in the field, its relation to economic growth, and our subsequent 
policy recommendations.  
 A society is said to face intergenerational persistence when the outcomes of 
descendants are correlated with, or dependent upon, the outcomes of their parents. In 
measuring intergenerational persistence, social scientists usually study persistence in 
income, social class, and educational attainment.  Thus a question asked in this field 
may be, “given a parent’s level of earnings or education, how likely is it that their 
descendants will also have that level of education and earnings?” 
 The process of transmission that causes intergenerational persistence is 
complex. Parents influence their offspring in many ways, for example by passing on 
hereditary abilities and characteristics, through the time spent with the children and the 
goods provided, and through direct financial investment in resources for the children’s 
development. All of these influencing factors interact with each other and the sum of 
them all creates a foundation for a descendant’s social and economic outcomes. Figure 
1, based on a framework by Leibowitz (1974) and further developed by Haveman and 
Wolfe (1995) and Schnetzer and Altzinger (2013), presents the underlying process of 
parental transmission of income and education to children, which strongly influences 
their later outcomes. The horizontal line of thought in the center, starting with parents’ 
abilities and education and moving to descendant income, shows that parents matter in 
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their contributions to decendants via their genetic traits, their quality and quantity of 
time and resources given to the descendants, and in the income/financial resources 
they provide to the household. These “home investments,” or those investments which 
are made in childrens’ development by private households, influence the level of 
education and ultimately the income of the child. The financial resources availabe to 
the family, which are determined in part by the parents’ education, influence the 
quantity and quality of time and goods invested in the children. A household’s financial 
situation is often also important in determining a child’s choice of school and eventually 
through direct transfers via inherited wealth, is important in determining financial 
position of the next generation. As Haveman and Wolfe put it (1995, p. 1834), “[g]iven 
their abilities (…) parents make a wide variety of decisions – including parental 
schooling, work effort, consumption, time allocation, and bequests – that are expected 
to be related to children's schooling and labor market attainments.” In sum, parents 
have a strong influence on their descendants’ outcomes.  
Figure 1 Investments in Children’s Attainments 
Source: Haveman and Wolfe (1995, p.1833), and Schnetzer and Altzinger (2013, p.121), with own 
amendments  
 
  4 
 
 Haveman and Wolfe’s (1995) model focuses entirely on private investments 
in a child’s development. We have amended their model to include public investments. 
Figure 1 now also illustrates the effect of state intervention in the process of investing 
in children. European welfare systems, though widely different from each other, share a 
tradition of providing support for their citizens. Figure 1 and the following sections of 
this report discuss the importance of two channels of public investment: first, 
investment in education, which should create equal educational opportunities early on 
and for all children, and which supports those less well-off and enables them to make 
informed decisions about their educational careers; and second, social security 
policies, which aim to strengthen households’ financial situations in order to give 
economic opportunities to all children, regardless of their family’s economic 
background. Since liquidity constraints can restrict investment in children’s education 
for those in less well-off households and consequently harm their development (OECD 
2008), it is important for the state to provide private households with financial 
resources, not just educational programs, which are more of an investment in a child’s 
future – not present – situation.   
 Public investments can diminish the differences in the investments that rich 
and poor families can make in their children. They help offset the unequal distribution 
of resources from parents by providing additional financial resources, quality care and 
education for socio-economically disadvantaged children, thereby lessening the social 
differences and reducing inequality and intergenerational persistence. As such, one of 
our policy recommendations concentrates on the provisioning of child care and pre-
school programs to level the playing field for all children in Europe. Similarly, we further 
advocate later tracking in school systems as a way to promote equality of opportunity 
regardless of socio-economic background and to lessen the existence of skill mismatch 
in an economy, which we discuss further below.  
 We have also included integration policy as an important framing of the entire 
transmission of resources and skills across generations. There are increasingly greater 
numbers of people who migrate across countries living in Europe. Although migrants 
often move to increase their own and their children’s chances at having a better life, 
being a migrant can have harmful effects on one’s opportunities in a new country if 
migrants are not well integrated into society, or adequate resources to assist migrants 
in integrating. The children of low-educated migrants may have little chance to “move 
up” on their own if the host country does not provide equal resources to migrants. As 
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we discuss in greater detail below, the integration of migrants into society is an 
important aspect of social equality and a society’s use of all of its resources, and we 
thus frame all investment in children in the context of integration – which may have to 
be achieved via additional policy. 
 The importance of public investments, the specific design and programs 
needed, as well as the empirical foundations upon which they are built will be 
presented in detail in the following pages of this report. Figure 1 serves as a guideline 
and an overview of these policies and their intervention in child development. But why 
intervene, and combat strong intergenerational persistence? 
In a society with high levels of intergenerational persistence, the outcomes of 
children are defined by their parents’ background; outcomes are dependent not on 
personal effort and investment, but instead are determined by the social background of 
one’s family. The consequences of intergenerational persistence can be severe, as it 
leads to a waste of personal potential, harming not only the individual but society and 
the economy as a whole. A high level of intergenerational persistence is troubling not 
only because it necessarily means that a society does not provide equality of 
opportunity to all of its members, but also because it is economically inefficient. With 
high levels of intergenerational persistence, descendants from low-income and less 
educated families will have fewer chances to succeed in school and in the labor 
market, even if the descendants are highly intelligent and skilled. In times of rapidly 
changing societies and a globalized economy, no country can afford not to make the 
most of its population’s productivity. Thus, policies targeted at keeping persistence low 
and enhancing an individual’s opportunities independent of social origin also reduce 
the social costs of skill mis-match and are beneficial to technological development. As 
such, they are of utmost importance to European prosperity. 
 Even if there is general agreement that strong intergenerational persistence 
should be combated, it is questionable whether mobility is a goal in itself. While there is 
a social value in a societal trend of upward mobility, i.e. mobility from low to high 
education levels or incomes, downward mobility is able to produce social losses. 
Moreover, the mechanisms which encourage downward mobility can be quite different 
and would have to be addressed by different policies. Atkinson (1981) was one of the 
first to address this issue. Using an Earnings Survey for Britain, Atkinson (1981) shows 
that the transition matrices for hourly earnings are asymmetric. He shows that wage 
  6 
 
persistence is in particular strong at both the top and the bottom part of the distribution. 
He concludes that there is less mobility down from the top than there is upward from 
the bottom. A similar conclusion has been provided by Dearden et al. (1997) with a 
longitudinal dataset that follows a cohort of individuals born in Britain in March 1958. 
They conclude that upward mobility from the bottom is more likely than downward 
mobility from the top. However, all these contributions measure intergenerational 
mobility in terms of earnings. Schneebaum et al. (2015), on the other hand, provide 
empirical evidence for Austria using EU-SILC data on intergenerational educational 
mobility for 2011. Using four different educational rankings, they show that the vast 
majority of mobility is upwards with only limited episodes of downward mobility. Most 
descendants either have the same or a higher level of education than their parents.  
 Independently of whether intergenerational mobility of education is a goal in 
itself, the empirical evidence shows that most of the mobility takes place upwards. This 
is in particular true if we focus on educational mobility. Hence in what follows we argue 
that mobility is first an indicator that educational attainment is independent from 
parental education. Second, educational mobility seems to be to a rather large extent 
upward mobility which will improve the human capital stock and thereby also the 
growth prospects of the economy. 
 In the following pages, we lay out all the important elements of 
intergenerational persistence and its implications for economic growth. The main aim of 
this policy report is to draw on the most recent evidence concerning the linkages 
between human capital accumulation and intergenerational persistence of economic 
outcomes in order to draw policy conclusions for Europe. The importance of human 
capital accumulation as a mediating variable in the relationship between income 
inequality and economic growth has been recently emphasized in the literature (see for 
instance Cingano, 2014). We thus concentrate on the linkage between 
intergenerational persistence of educational attainment and economic outcomes in this 
report. In Section two, we start with a detailed explanation of the concept and 
measurement of intergenerational persistence, indicating the central models and 
literature on the topic. We reference some of the most relevant pieces of empirical 
literature in the field, discussing their findings and putting them in the context of the “big 
picture” of intergenerational persistence across Europe. While the first three sections 
treat intergenerational persistence of socio-economic outcomes in general, the second 
part of the paper focuses on education. In Section three, we summarize the additional 
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empirical analyses on this topic recently conducted for Europe. Section four presents a 
new approach of creating an aggregate measure of intergenerational education 
mobility. Section five discusses the relevance of intergenerational education mobility for 
economic growth, and section six offers policy recommendations, with detailed 
background, explanations, and support from the literature.  
2. Intergenerational Persistence: Measurement and 
Interpretation 
 In trying to explain why intergenerational persistence exists, Becker and 
Tomes (1979; 1986) develop the archetypical model of human capital transmission, 
which is still central in the literature today. The model shows that socio-economic 
outcomes are positively correlated across generations because parents invest in their 
descendants’ education and are able to invest more as they have greater access to 
economic resources. Increases in descendant education levels enables them greater 
access to more income. Unlike Figure 1 above, the model by Becker and Tomes 
focuses entirely on financial transmission and does not take into account the other 
aspects of human, economic and social development. Solon (2004) makes important 
extensions to this model to study differences in intergenerational persistence over time 
and across countries, finding that intergenerational persistence is positively related to 
the “heritability of income-related traits, the efficacy of human capital investment, and 
the earnings return to human capital,” and that persistence is negatively related to 
public investments in human capital (p. 38). In other words, the more children get their 
characteristics from their parents and the less the state intervenes in supporting child 
development independent of parental investment, the more intergenerational 
persistence a society will face. 
 The models in Becker and Tomes (1979; 1986) and Solon (2004) focus on 
the role of human capital in intergenerational persistence, but it is important to note that 
(dis)advantages are transmitted across generations via investments in other forms of 
capital, as well. Indeed Esping-Andersen (2005, p. 14) states that it might not be 
unequal investments in children’s formal education alone that drive intergenerational 
persistence, but instead that “[i]t is in early childhood that parental transmission is key.” 
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As discussed in Esping-Andersen (2005), cultural and social capital1 is transmitted to 
children from their earliest days and influences their social, economic, and educational 
success throughout their lives. Cultural capital includes style of speech, physical 
appearance, skills, knowledge, attitudes, and formal educational training. How parents 
project themselves in the world and to their children, then, has meaningful 
consequences for the behaviors that children learn for themselves. The various forms 
of capital, including human, social, cultural, and financial capital, interact with each 
other; more of one makes the others more easily accessible. Thus parental advantages 
are passed to children in part through investments in descendants' human capital and 
additionally through the culture of the family, its social networks, and its level of 
financial resources.  
 It is important to note that the earlier a child is exposed to these advantages, 
the more beneficial they can be. Capital accumulation is dynamic in nature; not only is 
an early foundation necessary to prepare children for later, more advanced 
investments in their development, but the timing of the construction of this foundation is 
important, as well. The earlier the investment in human capital takes place, the longer a 
person has to build on it and benefit from it. In other words, knowledge and skills that 
are acquired in one’s early years do not only provide the direct advantages of having 
these skills, but they also serve as a baseline upon which more can later be built. 
Building on a solid foundation of knowledge and the ability to process new information 
facilitates future learning and the acquisition of human capital (Cunha and Heckman 
2009). Thus, the earlier these foundations are constructed, the more that can be 
developed further as a child gets older.  
 However, not all children have the same access and exposure to social, cultural 
and financial capital. Children of poor or uneducated parents are more likely to be poor 
or uneducated themselves. While persistence in outcomes across generations is highly 
advantageous for children born into well-off households, it can be a tremendous barrier 
to children born into disadvantaged households. In this sense, high degrees of 
intergenerational persistence are unfair and undermine a society’s meritocratic goals.  
  In general, a central goal of the academic work on intergenerational 
persistence is to contribute to our understanding of how public policy can affect 
                                                     
1
 See also the development of the theory of social capital in Bourdieu (1986). 
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intergenerational mobility. Speaking more broadly about intergenerational persistence, 
Becker and Tomes (1986, p.3) say that “[t]he degree of regression toward or away from 
the mean in the achievements of children compared to those of their parents is a 
measure of the degree of equality of opportunity in a society.” In other words, societies 
which have higher intergenerational persistence in social and economic outcomes 
provide less equal opportunity to their members than those with less persistence. While 
there is some degree of immobility in income as well as education in all countries 
around the world (Hertz et al. 2007; Corak 2013), differences in policy structures and 
institutional arrangements across countries can prevent or support intergenerational 
persistence. In terms of intergenerational persistence of income, the so-called “Great 
Gatsby Curve” in Figure 2 below, introduced in a speech to the US President by Alan 
Krueger using data from Miles Corak (2013), shows that “points cluster around an 
upward sloping line, indicating that countries that had more inequality across 
households also had more persistence in income from one generation to the next” 
(Krueger 2012). Or, vice versa, the more immobile incomes are, the more persistent is 
inequality in the distribution of income across generations. Andrews and Leigh (2009) 
provide further evidence of such a linkage based on analyzing the effects of past 
inequality on social mobility. This finding supports the idea that different social and 
economic policies across countries are associated with varying strength of 
intergenerational mobility. In this report, we emphasize how social and education policy 
can affect persistence in educational outcomes across generations.  
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Figure 2 The Great Gatsby Curve 
Source: Corak (2013) 
  
 Above we laid out the relevance of social, cultural, financial, and human capital 
in intergenerational persistence. Of course it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
measure most facets of an individual’s cultural or social capital. Chetty et al. (2014) 
found that areas of the United States with higher levels of social capital – as measured 
by higher voter turnout rates, higher percentages of households who return their 
Census form, greater participation in community organizations, more religiosity, and 
lower crime rates – have higher degrees of intergenerational income mobility. The 
importance of accounting for such contextual effects when integrating geography into 
the analysis of social capital and its relationship to education has been emphasized by 
Andersson and Malmberg (2014), for instance. In general, however, data on social and 
cultural capital are hard to come by and will always miss some aspects of one’s entire 
bundle of capitals. Empirical research on intergenerational persistence of social and 
economic outcomes can instead utilize data on income and educational attainment. 
Every empirical research study studying a relatively simple outcome such as income or 
years of education has its limitations; neither outcome tells the whole story of one’s 
economic and social success. However, measuring the intergenerational persistence of 
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income, educational attainment, and social class can provide important information 
about the inheritance of cultural, social, financial and human capital.  
 Blanden (2013) gives an excellent overview of different approaches and 
methods to measure intergenerational persistence of various outcomes used in the 
literature. For the most part, measuring persistence in income and education is done by 
calculating so-called intergenerational elasticities and correlations, using regression 
analysis to predict a descendants’ outcome based on the income or education of their 
parent(s). The level of persistence is the level of income or education a descendant 
acquires relative to the income or education of the parent. Elasticities measure the 
percentage change in the outcome (income or years of schooling) of a descendant 
given a percentage change in the outcome for a parent.  Correlations, on the other 
hand, adjust for distributional changes to the attainment of income or education for the 
entire population across generations. This adjustment is important because the spread 
of educational attainment levels and income tends to grow over time from one 
generation to the next. Ignoring these changes would suggest higher levels of 
intergenerational mobility because the younger descendants appear so much better off 
than their parents, but in reality, the greater mobility one would observe comes only 
from the fact that the distribution of the entire generation has changed. The 
intergenerational correlation is often higher than the elasticity; this occurs when the 
outcome is more widely dispersed for the younger generation than for the parents, 
which is often the case. Controlling for distributional changes gives a more accurate 
picture of the relationship between a descendant’s outcomes relative to his or her 
parents, because it eliminates the broad increases in the distribution of education and 
income that entire generations may have experienced. Intergenerational elasticities 
and correlations range between 0 and 1, with higher values signalling higher 
intergenerational persistence (Black and Devereux 2011). Income correlations in 
Europe are typically between 0.2 and 0.4, while those for education are typically 
between 0.4 and 0.6.  
Correlations and elasticities are widely used in part due to the fact that they can 
be interpreted in a relatively straightforward manner and compared across groups of 
individuals and countries. There are, however, less straightforward methods to 
measure intergenerational persistence. Education can be measured in terms of 
educational classes, based on degrees obtained. In this case, the methods of choice 
would be either a mobility matrix analysis (as discussed in Shorrocks 1978) or odds 
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ratios (as in Blanden 2013), which quantify the likelihood of class changes over 
generations. 
Elasticities, correlations, mobility matrices, and odds ratios are very informative 
measures of the relationship between parental and descendant outcomes, but they do 
not report a causal relationship of outcomes across generations. As Holmlund et al. 
(2011) point out, the causal effects of parent’s education on the educational attainment 
of their children can only be studied via twin parents or adoptee studies, or by using 
instrumental variable methods such as educational reforms in a quasi-experimental 
design. However, these methods do not always yield consistent results and it is 
consequently unclear whether “causal” studies are preferable at all. Indeed Holmlund 
et al. (2011) found that employing these three causal methods on the exact same 
dataset yielded quite different results. Thus, it is wise to recognize the limits of each of 
the methods to measure intergenerational persistence dicussed here, and instead to 
consider these measures as indicators of intergenerational persistence and its 
strength, not as absolute measures. 
 Income is either measured as household or individual income. Ideally, we 
would like to know the income of the subjects over their entire lifetimes, but that data 
would be exceptionally difficult to collect. Thus, researchers typically use an average of 
the income earned over three to five years as an approximation of lifetime earnings. A 
study on intergenerational income mobility by d’Addio (2007) shows that between 20% 
and 50% of parental income differences are passed on to the next generation in OECD 
countries, revealing not only that the descendant earnings are likely to be similar to 
those of their parents in countries throughout the EU, but also that there is a great 
amount of variation in the degree of intergenerational persistence across countries. 
Jäntti and Jenkins (2013) suggest that it is unclear how much of these differences are 
due to differences in measurement or data sources, but there are some common 
patterns across most studies. The lowest persistence is found in the Nordic countries, 
while in the UK and Italy a higher share of parental income is passed on to 
descendants (d'Addio 2007). Very similar results appear in studies by Solon (2002) and 
Corak (2006), both supporting the finding that Nordic countries are the most socially 
mobile ones compared to other European nations. While results in the US have 
sometimes been higher (e.g. Jäntti et al. 2006), a recent analysis using a very large 
amount of reliable administrative data found the intergenerational elasticity to be 0.34, 
which is comparable to Western European levels (Chetty et al. 2014). 
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A second outcome measure typically used in the literature, educational 
attainment, is measured using either schooling years or the highest degree obtained. 
Aside from education being an important measure of well-being in its own right, 
measuring the intergenerational persistence in educational attainment rather than in 
income offers some crucial advantages.  First, since income changes through different 
life stages, obtaining reliable information about lifetime earnings is difficult, at best. 
Parental education levels are a contributor to their permanent income levels, which 
have a much more positive role than current income in determining descendant 
outcomes (Carneiro and Heckman 2005).  Thus, education offers a more 
straightforward measure of economic and social status that generally remains constant 
after a certain age (Nguyen et al. 2005). Second, reporting income – or any monetary 
measure – is subject to response bias, in which respondents systematically under- or 
over-report their income based on a impression that they want to give to interviewers 
(Bielby et al. 1977). Individuals may be less inclined to misreport their educational 
attainment, as it is a less cut and dried measure of present well-being than income is. 
Finally, survey respondents, who are generally the descendants in the 
intergenerational persistence literature, are much more likely to know their parents’ 
level of education than their parents’ income at any point in time, producing less recall 
bias (see e.g. Nguyen et al. 2005; Black and Devereux 2011). 
When looking at the intergenerational educational persistence, Hertz et al. 
(2007) compare 42 countries worldwide over a time-period of 50 years. Among the 
European nations, persistence is high, although again lowest in the Nordic countries, 
but slightly decreasing over the last decades overall in European countries. While there 
are many studies looking at intergenerational mobility on a country level, only very few 
compare more than a handful of countries, making the study by Hertz et al. (2007) a 
distinct contribution to this field. International studies of more than just one country are 
so important because they should allow the researcher to control for variation in survey 
design and time frame, thus giving space to recognize differences in outcomes in the 
framework of variation in social policies across countries (Solon 2002). As we discuss 
in the next section, recent research has been carried out to compare intergenerational 
educational persistence across European countries (Schneebaum et al. 2014b) and 
construct new aggregate measures of intergenerational education mobility for a broad 
panel of countries (Crespo Cuaresma et al. 2013).  
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Finally2, the persistence of “social class” across generations has been an 
important field of research in the sociological literature. Most studies of social class or 
social status construct socio-economic indices based on income, education, and 
occupation3 to account for one’s social position, consumption possibilities, and 
decision-making power. These indices are then used to calculate odds ratios or log-
linear models in order to measure the relationship between descendant and parental 
social class. Blanden (2013) and Black and Devereux (2011) give excellent overviews 
of all of the methods and issues in choosing an outcome and measuring 
intergenerational persistence. 
  
3. The Empirics of Intergenerational Persistence in 
Europe 
A key foundation of the policy recommendations in this report is an analysis of 
studies of intergenerational educational persistence, measured by intergenerational 
correlations for different countries. On the one hand, we are interested in education as 
a socio-economic outcome in its own right. On the other hand there is a close 
relationship between education and income, but educational attainment is a more 
reliable measure of one’s socioeconomic position than (lifetime) earnings (see Section 
2). Thus, we measure how similar descendants’ educational attainment is to their 
parents’ and concentrate on these results in our policy prescriptions. This section 
discusses two new pieces of research and puts them into context with previously 
existing relevant studies.  
New research results concerning measures of intergenerational persistence in 
Europe have recently emerged. Schneebaum et al. (2015) analyze differences in 
intergenerational persistence based on gender and migration background in Austria, 
                                                     
2
 Another option slowly growing in the literature would be to measure the persistence of self-reported well-
being across generations. A recent study shows that results across Europe are similar to the results for 
educational attainment, even along the gender dimension we discuss below (Molina et al. 2011). 
 
3
 Occupation is usually based on employment status (self-employed or employee) and the number of 
employees that an employer has. Indices are then built to rank occupational status (see Erikson and 
Goldthorpe, 1992, for an overview of the methods). 
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while Schneebaum et al. (2014b) provide an extensive analysis of the role of gender 
across countries and policy systems in 20 European countries over time. 
In general, Schneebaum et al. (2014b) show the level of intergenerational 
educational persistence to lie between 0.41 in Denmark and 0.62 in Bulgaria, yielding 
comparable results to the existing literature. An additional year of parental education 
leads on average to about another half year of educational attainment for the 
descendants, indicating quite strong educational persistence all across Europe. Still, 
there are significant differences in the degree of persistence across countries and 
regions. In accordance with the literature, the authors find the highest mobility for the 
Nordic countries, while Southern and Eastern European nations appear to be the most 
persistent (see Section 2). 
In Schneebaum et al. (2014b), the authors further study the development of 
intergenerational persistence over time. Looking at the development of 
intergenerational mobility over the past decades and across 20 European nations, 
distinct patterns are found across country clusters. While in the Nordic and Southern 
countries persistence has fallen over time – though the Southern cluster started at a 
higher level and thus also could, and did, end with relatively high persistence – there is 
no significant change over time in the rest of Europe. Especially in the case of Eastern 
European countries, this development is alarming, as the level of persistence is very 
high in these nations. The finding of high persistence in Eastern Europe may also be 
somewhat surprising given these countries’ communist past; one would expect to see 
higher intergenerational mobility in this region, yet the opposite is true.  
Analyzing these developments of intergenerational persistence by gender offers 
a more comprehensive picture of the changes over time. The reduction of 
intergenerational persistence in the Nordic and Southern countries has been largely 
driven by women’s falling dependence on parental outcomes for their own educational 
success. Persistence for women has decreased significantly during the 20th century 
and thus powered the overall decrease of intergenerational persistence in those 
clusters. Furthermore, women in the Continental cluster have also become less 
dependent on the educational attainment of their parents over these decades. Thus in 
three of five clusters, women’s mobility has increased, while for men this is only true in 
the Continental and Anglo-Saxon cluster. Yet these last two do not display any 
significant changes over time for the overall population. In sum, the major changes in 
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intergenerational persistence over the past century took place in the Nordic and 
Southern countries and while the political approaches in these two regions are different 
as highlighted below, the increase in intergenerational mobility in both regions is due to 
the expansion of women’s educational attainment and much greater intergenerational 
mobility. 
One’s gender is related to other interesting aspects of intergenerational 
mobility, as well. The results in Schneebaum et al. (2014b) show that women in a 
majority of European countries (14 of 20 in the study) are more dependent on the 
educational attainment of their mothers, while sons’ education is always more highly 
correlated with that of the father (Portugal being the only exception). Accounting for 
migration background reveals a slightly different picture, though. 
Schneebaum et al. (2015) study second-generation migrants from non-EU 
countries (mainly Turkey and the former Yugoslavia) moving into Austria and find that 
migrants have different levels of intergenerational educational persistence than natives. 
Descendants of parents who migrated face higher persistence than natives overall. 
Taking the analysis one step further and dividing the sample of migrants and natives by 
gender allows a more nuanced story to emerge. Migrant men are more mobile than 
both native men and women. Moreover, they are more likely to move into a higher 
educational class than their parents. Migrant women, on the other hand, comprise the 
group facing the most intergenerational persistence, hardly ever leaving the 
educational class that her father has.  The fact that migrant men are more mobile than 
native women suggests that gender is the more constraining factor to educational 
mobility compared to migration background. Second generation migrant women, who 
face a “double disadvantage,” in that they are members of two marginalized 
populations, are by far the most immobile group and have the worst educational 
outcomes. Their educational success is more heavily dependent on their parents’ 
educational attainment than any other group.   
 Another aspect of the gender-specific analysis assesses differences in 
persistence based on the gender of the descendant and the parent in question. The 
results in Schneebaum et al. (2015) show that daughters benefit strongly from a mother 
having tertiary education, while fathers’ educational attainment is a more important 
predictor of native sons’ educational success than native daughters’. However, fathers’ 
education also plays an important role for migrant daughters. These findings suggest 
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that the reproduction of gender role ideology may be stronger in native families; it is 
there that sons follow fathers and daughters follow mothers. The benefit of having a 
highly educated father is stronger for migrant women than it is for native women. 
The existing literature on intergenerational educational persistence provides 
inconsistent results on tests of the relevance of having a migration background on a 
group’s intergenerational persistence. First, some studies using data from the United 
States conclude that immigrants face higher mobility than natives (Borjas 1992; d’Addio 
2007); similar results are found for Germany (Gang and Zimmermann 2000). However, 
studies for Sweden (Hammarstedt and Palme 2005) and Switzerland (Bauer and 
Riphahn 2006) find that the persistence among migrants is higher than among natives.  
Being a migrant into a new country is an important factor of social and 
economic intergenerational persistence, and one’s country of origin plays an important 
role in determining this persistence. Bauer and Riphahn (2006) for Switzerland, 
Aydemir et al. (2013) for Canada, and Hammarstedt and Palme (2005) for Sweden all 
find that there is great heterogeneity across ethnic groups coming into a country. 
Depending on where the migrants come from, their dependence on their parents’ 
educational outcomes can be more or less important. The analysis in Schneebaum et 
al. (2015) supports these findings: EU-migrants to Austria (mainly from Germany) have 
significantly higher education levels than non-EU migrants (mainly from Turkey and the 
former Yugoslavia), and EU migrants are much more mobile across generations than 
non-EU migrants. Thus several dimensions of a person’s migration background can 
influence his or her intergenerational persistence. 
In sum, we can highlight four main results coming out of the surveyed recent 
research. First, there are large differences in intergenerational persistence for men and 
women, and results differ by the gender of the parent as well: children’s educational 
outcomes are most persistent with respect to their same-gender parent. Second, 
women with a migration background – facing the double disadvantage of being in two 
marginalized groups – face the strongest intergenerational persistence and rarely 
surpass the educational levels of their parents, while male migrants seem to be quite 
mobile, perhaps much because of their vocational training. Third, the decreases 
observed in intergenerational persistence in the last decades have been driven mainly 
by improvements in women’s mobility. Finally, the cluster of European Nordic countries 
shows the greatest intergenerational mobility, which presumably has been fuelled by 
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promoting gender equality as well as their simultaneous investments in both 
educational and later social security policies. These results serve as drivers for our 
policy recommendations to increase access to vocational training, implement 
integration programs for migrants, have later school tracking, and offer universal child-
care. 
4. An Aggregate Measure of Education Mobility 
Intergenerational persistence is understood as the dependence of children’s 
socio-economic outcomes on the conditions and resources of their parents. Research 
usually approaches intergenerational dependence from a micro perspective. With 
respect to education, this means comparing parental educational attainment to that of 
their descendants using individual survey data (see Sections 2 and 3). From a macro 
perspective, on the other hand, intergenerational persistence of education can be 
understood as the educational outcomes of younger generations to resemble those of 
their parent generation, on average. A recent paper by Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2013) 
takes on this idea in order compute an aggregate measure of intergenerational 
education mobility. In this section, we survey their data, method and results in order to 
provide additional policy relevant insight into the dynamics of intergenerational mobility 
across countries over time.      
A comparison of educational outcomes across generations is rendered possible 
by the recently developed global dataset of populations by age, sex, and levels of 
education from the International Institute for Applied System Analysis and the Vienna 
Institute of Demography (IIASA/VID). Building upon these new data, Crespo Cuaresma 
et al. (2013) construct a dataset of measures of inequality as well as mobility in 
educational attainment for 175 countries, spanning the period from 1960 to 2010. 
Based on the shares of the population with no formal, primary, secondary or tertiary 
education, in conjunction with the formal duration it takes in order to complete each 
level, education Gini coefficients by age and gender are computed. As with the income 
Gini, the education Gini ranges from zero to one, with higher values reflecting a less 
equal distribution. An education Gini of zero means that the entire population attains 
the same education level, regardless of which. An education Gini of unity implies one 
person has tertiary, and the rest does not attain any education.  
The demographic structure of the dataset enables Crespo Cuaresma et al. 
(2013) to create a broad measure of intergenerational education mobility which is 
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based on comparing the distribution of educational attainment among older and 
younger cohorts. More specifically, education mobility is defined as the ratio between 
the education Gini coefficients of the 25-54 and the 55+ age groups. At a value equal 
to one, the distribution of the young generation over the four education categories 
resembles that of the older generation. The closer the ratio is to zero, the more equally 
is education distributed among the youth than among the elderly, with the reverse 
being true for a value above one. From an intergenerational point of view, the 
relationship between the education distributions of the broad age groups is thus 
consistent with perfectly immobile education levels in the former case, equalizing and 
segregating mobility in the second and latter case respectively. Looking at the relative 
distribution of education across generations captures the relation between inequality 
and mobility: with little or no mobility, an unequal society in one generation will end up 
being an unequal society in the next generation too. Only if intergenerational mobility is 
accelerating, younger generations can be more equal societies than their ancestors. 
As opposed to the micro level measures presented in previous sections, Crespo 
Cuaresma et al. (2013) provide a simple catch-all measure of intergenerational 
education mobility at the aggregate level which relies on the assumption that a more 
equal distribution of education among the youth than among the elderly implies that 
education has been mobile across generations. Thus, cohort effects such as a general 
increase in the spread of education from one generation to the other might lead to an 
overestimation of education mobility at the aggregate level. Moreover, elasticities and 
correlation coefficients based on individual data are bound between zero and one, 
while the aggregate measure might exceed one. Such a scenario resembles a 
downward-mobility pattern if the majority of the older age group attains secondary but 
some of their descendants attain only primary education. However, especially for 
already highly educated economies, a scenario in which the share of tertiary educated 
among the young increases at the expense of the middle part of the education 
distribution is more relevant. Even if micro and macro measures are not directly 
comparable, they provide a similar picture of cross-country patterns in the degree of 
intergenerational mobility in educational attainment. 
Figure 3 presents a scatter plot relating the education Gini coefficient of the total 
population aged 25 and above to the aggregate measure of intergenerational mobility. 
Each dot represents a country-time observation of the full panel dataset in Crespo 
Cuaresma et al. (2013); red dots correspond to 41 European countries as defined by 
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the United Nations’ macro geographical (continental) region. Between a Gini of 0.6 and 
0.2, the relation resembles the “Great Gatsby Curve” plotted in Figure 2 for income. 
However, over the whole range of the education Gini, the two indicators hint at a U-
shaped relationship. If each generation reproduces equally high levels of educational 
inequality, the education Gini as well as the education mobility index is close to one. 
Such high inequality and persistence in educational attainment are mainly observed in 
Sub-Saharan and South Asian countries. As exemplified by Brazil and the education 
expansion dynamics of South Korea, approaching a lower degree of education 
inequality is only feasible by equalizing the education distribution among the youth 
relative to that among the elderly. 
As the overall education Gini coefficient approaches zero, the room for 
additional improvements narrows and education becomes increasingly immobile across 
generations, in the sense captured by the aggregate indicator. However, also within the 
low-inequality group, quite different dynamics can be observed. In the United Kingdom, 
education was relatively persistent in the 1980s, compared to other European 
countries, but a phase of accelerating mobility started thereafter. Denmark and Finland, 
on the other hand, sustained a relatively high mobility level as they reduced 
educational inequality. Denmark shows a mobility index above unity since 1990, 
indicating a higher degree of education inequality among the younger than among the 
older age group. This is due to a relatively strong increase in the share of tertiary 
educated people in the population aged 25-54 from 9 % in 1960 to 28 % in 2010, 
compared to the population aged 55 and over, thereby widening the gap between the 
lower and the upper tails of the education distribution. On the other hand, in Finland the 
share of tertiary educated fluctuated around 40 % in each of the two age groups since 
2000, suggesting high intergenerational persistence in the educational attainment 
structure. 
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Figure 3: Education Inequality vs. Aggregate Education Mobility. Source: Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2013), with 
amendments. 
 
Panel A of Figure 4, which depicts the dynamics of the education mobility 
indicator by European subregion over time, demonstrates that these patterns are 
representative for the broader country groups. In the Anglo-saxon cluster, the ratio of 
young-to-old education Gini coefficients increased until 1985, before consistently 
decreasing thereafter. Northern Europe started out as a highly mobile economy in 
1960, but is characterized by persistency in the education structure since 2000. An 
increasing value of the aggregate mobility measure is also observed in Continental and 
Eastern European countries. This tendency was, however, stronger in Continental 
Europe. On the contrary, education became increasingly mobile in Southern and 
South-Eastern European countries. 
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Figure 4: Education Mobility in European Regions 1960-2050. Source: Crespo et al. (2013). 
 Anglo-Saxon Europe: United Kingdom, Ireland; Continental Europe: Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, 
  Netherlands, Switzerland; Eastern Europe: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
 Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine; Southern Europe: Cyprus Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, 
Spain; South-Eastern Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro, Republic of 
Moldova, Romania, Serbia, TFYR Macedonia, Turkey.  
  
 Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2013) also provide projections of the aggregate 
education mobility measure from 2010 to 2050 which are presented in Panel B of 
Figure 4. In general, convergence among European regions to a value slightly below 
one is projected by the Global Education Trend (GET) scenario, proposed by KC et al. 
(2010), which corresponds to extrapolating the historical trends in educational 
attainment observed for the world sample of countries. This is due to the fact that 
European economies are relatively mature with respect to their distribution of 
educational attainment. Since Southern, South- Eastern and Anglo-Saxon economies 
started out with a relatively low mobility ratio of around 0.4 in 2010, these countries are 
projected to gradually close the gap in education inequality between young and old age 
groups. On the other hand, in Continental and Northern Europe, the degree of 
inequality in the education distribution is projected to slightly decrease among 
subsequent young cohorts. After 2030, the education distribution of the youth is 
predicted to be more unequal than that of the elderly in Eastern Europe. The mobility 
ratio is therefore projected to increase above one in several Eastern European 
countries. 
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5. Intergenerational Persistence of Education and 
Economic Growth 
From the preceding sections it follows that encouraging intergenerational 
mobility, thus providing for everybody to have the same life chances independent of his 
or her circumstances, should be at the top of a policy agenda which pursues equality of 
opportunity and outcomes. Beyond that, the degree of intergenerational persistence is 
relevant for the society and the economy as a whole. Societies in which a constant or 
increasing part of the population is being left behind are impaired by a range of factors, 
including high crime rates, political instability and civil unrest. While these 
consequences of social segregation are of importance in their own right, they are also 
relevant economically. Social discontent and political instability create an environment 
of distrust and uncertainty about prospective social and economic developments which 
is detrimental to physical and human capital investment, thereby not only affecting 
short-run growth rates but also the long-run growth path of an economy. In their 
influential article, Alesina and Perotti (1996) provided evidence that inequality favours 
socio-political instability which is in turn detrimental to private and public physical 
capital investment and thus to income growth. 
Moreover, intergenerational mobility – especially with respect to education - is 
related to economic growth in a more direct way. A high degree of intergenerational 
persistence in educational attainment implies that children of each well-off parent 
generation have access to higher education levels, while children from disadvantaged 
socio-economic backgrounds may not proceed above primary or lower secondary 
education, irrespective of their intelligence and talents. Thus, a share of the population 
is prevented from developing and applying its skills in the labour market. The resulting 
misallocation of human capital dampens the productivity of the labour force. Most 
importantly, a broad base of talented and educated people is essential for sustainable 
economic growth based on innovation and technology creation or adoption. 
While an extensive literature highlights the special role of human capital for 
technological progress based on education externalities (Lucas, 1988), idea creation 
and innovation (Romer, 1990), or imitation and adoption (Nelson and Phelps, 1996; 
Aghion and Howitt, 1996), Galor and Tsiddon (1997) provide a theoretical framework 
for explaining the interaction between intergenerational mobility of human capital, 
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technological progress and economic growth. Even though individuals’ educational 
attainment depends on the level of human capital of their parents to some extent, 
technological progress tends to increase the overall wage rate by the same amount 
and creates incentives for human capital accumulation for the skilled as well as the 
unskilled. This reduces the role of family background, thus accelerating 
intergenerational mobility and generating a more equal distribution of education among 
the descendant generation than among the parent generation. As technologies mature 
and returns to skills diminish, incentives for additional investments in education vanish 
and the existing educational composition persists until the next technological impulse. 
The observed and the predicted period in Figure 4 nicely reveal a pattern of phases of 
intergenerational mobility alternating with phases of persistence in the educational 
structure, resembling these theoretical predictions by Galor and Tsiddon (1997).  At the 
same time, mobility provides for the existence of a broad pool of talented people who 
invent, adopt and imitate technologies. In the framework of this model, 
intergenerational mobility of education thus plays a central, mediating role in inducing 
as well as absorbing technological progress as a basis for economic growth.  
An increasing body of recent research analyzes the relevance that the degree 
of inequality in the distribution of educational attainment has for economic growth, in 
addition to the effect of the average level of human capital (Castelló-Climent, 2011; 
Sauer and Zagler, 2014). The empirical work by Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2013) builds 
on and adds to this literature by studying the link between intergenerational education 
mobility and economic growth at the macroeconomic level using the global dataset of 
education inequality and mobility presented in the previous section. In order to 
empirically test for the presumed positive relation between education mobility and 
economic growth, Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2013) set up a regression model which 
relates the average growth rate of real GDP per capita to the initial level of income per 
capita, the capital stock and population growth rates, the average level of educational 
attainment, measured by the mean years of schooling in the population aged 25 and 
over, and, most importantly, to the aggregate measure of intergenerational education 
mobility. Doing so provides strong evidence for the existence of a relationship between 
intergenerational persistence in education and income growth. The effect is sizeable: 
increasing the measure of intergenerational persistence by 0.25 points, for instance, 
tends to decrease income growth by 0.93 percentage points per year.  This effect is 
additional to that of the accumulation of human capital, which implies that education 
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policy targeting educational expansions that allow in parallel to reduce 
intergenerational persistence appear to bring the highest return in terms of sustained 
income growth rates.  
In order to assess quantitatively the potential economic growth returns of future 
changes in intergenerational persistence and thus in the distribution of education, we 
perform a simple projection exercise. Using the economic growth elasticity implied by 
the panel regressions in Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2013) and the expected changes in 
the distribution of education across age groups computed using the methods in KC et 
al. (2010), we compare the projected income per capita growth rates for the 
forthcoming four decades with counterfactual projections that assume no change in the 
distribution of education. The difference in annual growth rates of GDP per capita from 
the two alternative scenarios which is implied exclusively by the effect of distributional 
changes in educational attainment is depicted in Figure 5. These differentials imply 
negative expected effects for the group of European economies which have the lowest 
average income per capita levels and thus suggest that intergenerational persistence 
dynamics may act as a barrier of further income convergence in the continent.  
 
Figure 5: Projected average income growth differentials from distributional changes in education: GET scenario 
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To sum up, looking at an aggregate measure of intergenerational mobility which 
is based on comparing the degrees of education inequality across age groups provides 
insights into the dynamics of persistency and inequality for a broad panel of countries 
over long time horizons. We observe differences in persistence not only at a global but 
also at a European level. Moreover, a higher degree of intergenerational mobility is 
associated with higher growth rates of income per capita. Such a result emphasizes 
that policies aiming at providing broad-based access to schooling, which are oriented 
towards reducing the intergenerational persistence of educational attainment, have 
returns in terms of economic growth that go significantly beyond those implied by the 
improvement in overall educational attainment. 
      
6. Policy Recommendations 
Based on the set of theoretical and empirical results discussed above, we make four 
main policy recommendations to curb intergenerational persistence and contribute to 
income per capita growth in Europe through human capital formation. These are: 
• universal and high-quality child care and pre-school programs; 
• later tracking and more access to vocational training, with a focus on avoiding skill 
mismatch and facilitating technology development; 
• integration programs for migrants; 
• a two-pronged government spending approach: investment should target education 
and social support policies at the same time. 
 
As Figure 1 shows, our four policies work as particular types of subsidies of family 
income and “home investment,” meaning all resources that children receive from their 
parents, giving all households adequate opportunity to invest in their young members. 
Early childhood education policy and the later tracking policies augment and enhance 
the skills learned at home, while the social support policy enhances the positive effects 
of family income. The policy to help migrants integrate ensures that all members of a 
society have a change to succeed. We discuss more specific background and support 
for these recommendations in turn.  
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Provision of Universal, High-quality Childcare and Pre-school 
Programs 
 Blau and Currie (2006) provide an outstanding review of the literature on the 
demand and supply of child care and pre-school programs, and the effects on the 
“quality of child” that they produce. There is overwhelming evidence of positive effects 
of child care and pre-school programs for their participants (Blau and Currie 2006; 
Currie and Almond 2011; OECD 2010a). Overall, children who participate in a child 
care program between the ages of 0 and 5 show stronger cognitive development, 
general knowledge, cooperative behavior, and peer interaction (Blau and Currie 2006, 
table 8). Further, participation in a pre-school program has strong and positive effects 
on later academic achievement. Children who were enrolled in a pre-school program 
have higher IQ scores throughout their time in compulsory school; have better high 
school grade point averages (GPAs); are more likely to graduate from high school; and 
they have higher earnings at age 27 (Blau and Currie 2006, table 16). The evidence of 
positive effects on the skills, educational attainment, and socio-economic situation of 
participants in child care and pre-school programs is quite convincing. 
 Heckman (2006) shows that early intervention helps reproduce positive 
effects via the dynamic nature of cognitive and non-cognitive abilities. “Skill begets skill; 
motivation begets motivation” (Heckman 2006), which means that earlier investment in 
education and development leaves a greater amount of time for future development . 
These investments pay off not only by increasing individuals’ schooling levels and 
income, but by reducing crim and improving health, thus reducing the need for public 
spending on the health system and public safety later on. Thus, investments in early 
childhood programs pay off multiple times over and have highly positive benefit-cost 
ratios, where a euro spent early is associated with several euros earned and saved 
later (Heckman 2006). The workings of investment in child development in Figure 1 
makes these mechanisms clear: public investment in and provisioning of high quality 
universal early childhood care and education programs can assist parental home 
investments and provide positive stimulation for children’s abilities, throughout their 
schooling and later life. 
 Besides personal positive effects, early childhood programs can have strong 
positive effects on a society’s well-being. They can help reduce the persistence of 
intergenerational persistence in education and income, and they can also play an 
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important role in promoting gender equality in the economy. Recall that Schneebaum et 
al. (2014b) study gender differences in intergenerational educational mobility across 
Europe and find that sons’ educational attainment is more highly correlated with their 
fathers’ than their mothers’, while daughters’ educational attainment is more dependent 
on the outcomes of their mothers than their fathers. In most countries, fathers’ 
education is also more influential for the educational attainment of the sons than for 
that of the daughters. Because of labor market discrimination, women’s occupational 
choice, and labor market supply (the number of hours spent in the labor market), 
women’s investment in higher education does not pay off as much as men’s. Women 
are more likely to engage in part-time work and are often segregated into lower-paying 
industries and occupations. Public policy offering universal and high quality child care 
can help bridge the gap between high education and labor market equality for women, 
and will also help distill intergenerational persistence. This is the case for several 
reasons. 
 First, child care can be made high-quality, by demanding more highly 
educated caregivers, and providing high-paying jobs for highly educated employees – 
who are, in that sector, mainly women. Second, it would promote women’s employment 
in other sectors that demand highly educated workers with flexible schedules by 
providing care for their children while they are at work. Thus women’s labor market 
supply could increase and women could become more willing to enter traditionally 
male-dominated fields. Third, at the same time, the stereotype of women’s lesser 
commitment to work would fade as their opportunities to do more work would expand. 
These changes could reduce discrimination against women, further enhancing the first 
two effects. The literature does indeed find that state-subsidized child care and pre-
school programs have significant positive impacts on mothers’ employment (Blau and 
Currie 2006, table 13). Finally, the children of these highly educated mothers – and 
especially daughters, following the results in Schneebaum et al. (2014b) – would 
benefit by positive gains to their own education, by having more income in the 
household, by receiving better childcare, and by having a positive role model in the 
household. Thus a virtuous circle of women’s advancement in the labor market could 
develop. 
 Not only daughters would benefit from these policies. Sons are also often 
constrained by the financial restrictions of their parents, and those benefits would 
positively affect them, too. Especially but not exclusively in the case of single mothers, 
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universal child care can help reduce the risk of child poverty by increasing mothers’ 
ability to work and provide sufficient financial resources. Sons and daughters would 
then benefit and face more educational opportunities, leading to higher 
intergenerational mobility. The positive effects of early education programs on a child's 
later outcomes are widely recognized (Heckman 2008; Schütz et al. 2008; Cunha and 
Heckman 2009; Currie and Almond 2003; OECD 2010a). However, insufficient supply 
or a lack of quality of these programs leads to restricted chances for children to benefit 
from them, and make it more difficult for mothers to work and contribute to household 
income. Consequently, early childhood programs and their link with female 
employment help explain the lower intergenerational persistence in Nordic European 
countries. Investment in pre-school and early education programs in Nordic countries 
has been helpful in promoting intergenerational mobility, combating poverty, and 
stimulating growth, and we recommend it as a universal policy plan for all of Europe.  
Later Tracking and Access to Vocational Training; Distillation of Skill 
Mismatch 
As Schütz et al. (2005) show in an analytical model and confirm with empirical 
results for 54 countries, including almost all EU countries (Schütz et al. 2008), tracking 
students into different school types hinders educational equality by enhancing the 
effect of family background characteristics on a student’s educational success. In 
particular, they find that lowering the age of first tracking by four years leads to an 
increase in the effect of family background characteristics on a person’s educational 
outcomes by 25%. Tracking locks students into an educational path determined by 
their socio-economic background. The earlier this tracking occurs, the more likely it is 
that the students will follow their parents’ paths in education. Having early tracking 
systems means that children need to decide what educational path they will take 
without having full information of their options and opportunities; this situation makes 
them strongly dependent on parent or teacher recommendations. Indeed Schneeweis 
und Zweimüller (2014) study the tracking system in Austria and show that the young 
age at which Austrian students are tracked (at 10 years old) is especially harmful to the 
later educational success of younger students in each grade (those born later in the 
year than their classmates) and students from poorer socioeconomic backgrounds.   
Thus, we suggest that later tracking – or no tracking at all – would benefit Europe by 
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distilling the dependence of descendant educational outcomes on the education of their 
parents. 
Hand in hand with their relation to intergenerational persistence, tracking 
schemes also have important consequences for economic and social inequality. OECD 
research has shown that tracking programs are associated with greater inequality in 
educational outcomes within and across countries, as evidenced by differences in PISA 
test scores (OECD 2010b, p. 15). Further, immigrants into countries with stratified 
educational systems (i.e. tracking) are less likely to obtain higher education degrees 
than those in countries without tracking. Thus, eliminating tracking programs or starting 
tracking at a later age can reduce intergenerational persistence as well as inequality in 
schooling outcomes within and across countries (Gringa und Hadjar 2014).   
 Along with later tracking to counteract descendants’ dependence on parental 
outcomes and educational inequality, vocational training can be very helpful in 
providing equal opportunity. Vocational training is helpful for several reasons. First, 
vocational training programs benefit society by training people to be able to do socially 
useful and relevant skilled work. Second, they give students the choice between the 
type of education they would like to pursue, and allow students interested in an 
academic track or a vocational track the opportunity to become skilled in their field of 
choice. Third, formal vocational training ensures that those who complete it have some 
formal qualification to depend on in the labor market (Scarpetta et al. 2010). Finally, 
vocational training programs are highly effective against youth unemployment 
(Scarpetta et al. 2010).  An excellent review by Wößmann (2008) shows that the 
literature on vocational programs contains mixed findings on the overall effectiveness 
of vocational programs for promoting economic equality. On the one hand, these 
programs train workers in a specific field, allowing them to become highly qualified 
experts and thus raising their wages and employability. On the other hand, it may be 
the case that technological change can make vocational training obsolete relatively 
quickly, putting older workers with this training at risk (Hanushek et al. 2011). In this 
sense, adult education programs are an important complement to vocational training; 
these training programs for older workers are already implemented in some countries 
(Tessaring und Wannan 2004) . In any case, vocational training does increase the 
employment rate of young workers, and it is especially beneficial to workers who come 
from lower socio-economic backgrounds, who are more likely to enroll in vocational 
programs. The training increases employment rates, which is good for the workers 
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themselves and further benefits the children of young vocationally-trained fathers and 
mothers, who will benefit from growing up in a household with higher income – a major 
advantage for a child’s own economic success. Investments in vocational training 
programs and later tracking of students therefore directly affects the educational 
attainment of children and can help socio-economically disadvantaged but high 
potential youth to fully develop their abilities, independent of their family background.  
 Later tracking and the implementation and promotion of vocational training can 
be very helpful in reducing skill mismatch in Europe’s labor markets. Skill mismatch 
occurs when people in the labor force are well-trained but cannot find a job that 
requires their skills. Vocational training can help reduce this mismatch by providing 
educational programs geared at the exact needs of the economy. These needs may 
change rapidly and drastically, but stand-alone vocational programs should be able to 
adapt more quickly to these changes than entire school systems for all students. Later 
tracking would further mean that students could make more informed choices which 
field of work to enter, rather than being allocated there based mainly on their 
background. Giving students (who become workers) a better choice in their profession 
would increase the likelihood that they will select fields in which they are interested and 
talented, which would increase the chances for them to be able to get relevant work. 
This, in turn is expected to affect the rate of technological progress (and thus economic 
growth) by fuelling innovation.   
Taken all together, later tracking and vocational programs can be beneficial to 
the European economy and society as a whole and their implementation is therefore 
recommendable.  
Integration Programs for People with a Migration Background 
People who migrate into new countries or who come from families with a 
background of migration can face different conditions determining intergenerational 
persistence compared to natives, and migrants can face particular challenges which 
lead to less successful educational outcomes. A review of educational and income 
mobility at a global level by d’Addio (2007) shows that migrants face different 
circumstances and social processes which affect intergenerational mobility; depending 
on where migrants come from and into which country they migrate, they can face 
greater or lesser degrees of intergenerational persistence in economic outcomes. 
Students who come from a family with a migration background also tend to perform 
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worse on PISA tests (OECD 2010b). Consequently, policies targeted at the specific 
needs of people with a migration background are necessary to reduce any additional 
intergenerational persistence that migrants may face and to improve their educational 
outcomes.  
One policy directed at increasing the educational opportunity of migrant 
populations is better access to and financial support for language courses. Proficient 
language skills are essential for educational and occupational opportunities and the 
success of migrants into a new country (Schneeweis, Educational Institutions and the 
Integration of Migrants 2011). Furthermore, the earlier these investments into learning 
the national language are made, the better the outcomes and the higher the returns 
can be. Yet it is not only the national language that should be acquired during the early 
childhood, but also cognitive and non-cognitive skills that lay the foundation for later life 
educational success. While pre-school programs offer positive effects for all children, 
studies in the literature find that individuals with a migration background benefit 
particularly strongly from them (d'Addio 2007). 
Similarly, early tracking and the lack of availability of vocational training are 
correlated with higher intergenerational persistence for migrants (Gang and 
Zimmermann 2000). People with a migration background are often less aware of the 
educational system in their new country and the opportunities for educational 
advancement available to them. Gang and Zimmermann (2000) show that a students’ 
dependency on teacher recommendations for knowledge about and admission into 
educational programs is related to higher intergenerational persistence of migrants 
than natives, in part because of implicit teacher preferences for majority groups and 
their values which can cause instructors to be less helpful to students with a migration 
background. Thus, to lower dependency on a small number of (potentially biased) 
teachers to help the child get an education, societies can keep students together and 
not put them into tracking programs until much later (if at all), and offer well-developed, 
degree-granting vocational programs to all. European countries should also recognize 
degrees granted by vocational training programs from abroad, to help integrate and 
benefit from the skills of all people living in a country, regardless of their background 
(Tessaring und Wannan 2004).   
Vocational programs are of particular importance for migrants; however, 
migrants may not have equal access to them. Indeed Gringa und Hadjar (2014) show 
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that migrants into European countries without tracking plans, such as the 
Scandanavian welfare states and former state-socialist countries (e.g. East Germany) 
are more likely to get a vocational degree. Italy is another case of migrants having 
been able to take advantage of vocational training programs (Ragazzi und Sella 2013). 
Migrants in “tracking countries” (e.g. Austria, West Germany), on the other hand, are 
less likely to obtain vocational training. Indeed empirical findings for Austria (Altzinger 
et al. 2013) and Germany (Burkert and Seibert 2007; Worbs 2003) exhibit a relatively 
clear trend: while long established and well working vocational training programs exist 
in these countries, migrants often face limited access to them. Thus there is an 
important connection between tracking, the availability of vacational training, and 
migration background.  
Differences by gender are sometimes discussed in this literature as well. 
Migrant women are less likely to enroll in vocational programs than migrant men 
(Altzinger et al. 2013). Thus for females the chances of gaining higher education 
through vocational training are limited. Creating vocational programs and reducing 
access barriers for migrants is hence of greatest importance for the integration of 
migrants. 
Finally, central examinations could help prevent achievement gaps for students 
with a migration background, since they provide more objective measures of student 
achievement and help reduce the influence of non-performance aspects of education 
on the grading of children (Wößmann 2005). Therefore central examinations could be 
particularly positive for migrant students, though similar to later tracking and early 
childhood programs can benefit all children. 
Policies targeted at the specific needs of children with a migration background 
are thus expected to promote educational mobility for all children, yet they are essential 
for the success of migrants.  Raising the awareness of these requirements and policies 
aiming at specific subpopulations can help children with a migration background 
develop their full potential. Migrants have different background chanacteristics and the 
literature shows that specific groups of migrants face stronger intergenerational 
persistence, calling for special programs that take these differences and special needs 
into account. Adressing the needs of and supporting these particular groups is 
consequently of utmost importance as equality of opportunity implies equality for 
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natives and migrants alike. Consequently, programs targeted at the integration of 
migrants should frame all other programs and be the core element of all policy. 
Simultaneous Investment in Educational and Social Security 
Programs 
In Figure 1, which shows how social policy can be used to support investments 
in children, we include policies aimed at both educational outcomes as well as social 
security. Our work for the WWWforEurope project has found that this two-pronged 
approach to public investment appears to be most helpful in combating 
intergenerational persistence and encouraging equality and growth. Schneebaum et al. 
(2014b) offer a country- and country cluster-level analysis of intergenerational 
educational persistence for 20 European countries, finding that as a whole, the Nordic 
cluster has the highest level of intergenerational educational mobility. The clusters 
were built based on similarity in policy across countries, following Esping-Andersen’s 
groundbreaking work on classifying “worlds of welfare capitalism” (Esping-Andersen 
1990) and later additions to the model by others (Ferrera 1996; Fenger 2007). The 
Nordic cluster is characterized by simultaneous investment in educational programs 
and social security programs. The Continental and Anglo-Saxon clusters focus on just 
one or the other policy (social security and education, respectively), and both clusters 
have higher rates of persistence than the Nordic cluster. The Eastern and Southern 
clusters have neither a particularly strong focus on either investment program nor the 
resources to implement them, and they have the highest rates of persistence.  
  The two-pronged approach to state investment taken in Scandinavian countries 
comes out being the one associated with the highest rates of intergenerational mobility 
because it supports people throughout the life-cycle. Investing in education alone puts 
pressure on reaping the benefits of this education on young persons, who may not yet 
be mature enough to receive the full benefits of the education offered to them. Further, 
a focus on educational programs does not protect people against labor market shocks 
that may require them to pursue more or different education as an adult. A focus on 
social security, on the other hand, may protect people against unemployment or labor 
market shocks, but it does not intervene early enough to get children off of the 
educational track already laid by their parents. Descendants of less educated parents 
face greater challenges to obtaining more education themselves and without 
intervention by the state to promote a system that gives all children equal educational 
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chances, descendants of families with a lower socio-economic background will have a 
harder time advancing on their own. 
 As described above, this two-pronged approach can also have important 
consequences for advancing gender equality. Greater investment in educational 
programs, including pre-school, can stimulate and support women’s labor force 
participation. Later financial support of private households would also protect 
households from falling into poverty, a circumstance to which especially women are 
vulnerable.  
 Thus, while potentially expensive, a two-pronged approach that includes early 
childhood education in its educational spending, which does not prioritize early or late 
social support, but instead provides both, seems to be most effective for supporting 
educational mobility and social equality. Moreover, it creates and supports a 
prosperous economic environment. The Nordic countries can serve as an example on 
how to successfully adopt a system that leads to higher female labor participation, a 
more egalitarian society where everyone has the opportunities to live up to his or her 
full potential, and eventually foster economic growth and a create a sustainable welfare 
state. We therefore recommend that countries attempt to provide support for education, 
including early education programs, and simultaneously invest in social security 
programs. It is this comprehensive approach that can reduce intergenerational 
persistence on a broader basis. Investment in either the education system or social 
security programs alone can never yield similar results. The joint investment of 
supporting families and creating education and care programs for the youngest children 
provides universal support and protection for those who need it most.  
The first four policies suggested in this report will be most effective is 
implemented together. Support for a person’s development throughout their lives would 
support and encourage their productivity. Europe’s sustainable, fair, and inclusive 
development would benefit from the policies suggested in this report, which above all 
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